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Abstract
Many countries have implemented the taxation of unhealthy food. Facing such a tax, firms can adapt their
pricing strategy and modify the characteristics of their products. There are, so far, only a few ex-ante analyses
of the impact of taxes on consumption that endogenize the price response of firms to the tax policy. However,
none of them takes into account the possibility for firms to modify the characteristics of a product. In this paper,
we propose an ex-ante evaluation of the effects of a tax that targets products high in caloric sweeteners on key
market outcomes, by integrating not only the strategic price reactions of firms, but also the exogenous changes
in a product’s nutritional composition. We develop a structural econometric model that integrates the consumer’s
substitution patterns between products, accounts for competition between firms, and integrates the possibility
for firms to modify the characteristics of a product in response to taxation. Using household scanner data from
the French dessert market, we show that ignoring how firms might react to a tax policy leads to a significant
underestimation of the potential impact of taxation on the consumption of taxed nutrients. In our case, we show
that ignoring the combined effect of strategic price reactions and product reformulation leads to the impact of
the tax on the intake of the taxed nutrient being underestimated by 44%. From a policy-oriented perspective, we
conclude that a taxation scheme should be designed to favor product reformulation by firms.
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1 Introduction
The number of countries that have implemented a tax on unhealthy foods is growing rapidly.1 Most taxes target
sugary beverages but in some cases they also target sugary products or fatty products.2 Ex-post evaluations of
the impact of taxation show that they can curb consumption (e.g., Colchero et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2017; Mora
et al., 2019; Capacci et al., 2019). The decrease of consumption is generally considered to be a consequence of
the price increase of taxed products. However, several studies have shown that the price transmission of the tax is
heterogeneous. For example, in the case of the soda tax in Berkeley, Silver et al. (2017) found that the pass-through
of the tax depends on the type of retailer.3 Capacci et al. (2019), in the case of the soda tax in France, found that
the pass-through rate depends on the type of beverage.4
In addition to price changes, tax policy can also induce changes in the characteristics of products, as has been
shown in theoretical analysis. Duvaleix-Tréguer et al. (2012) studied how firms react to a tax based on the nutrient
content of their products. In their framework, a product is taxed only if its content in the targeted nutrient is above
a threshold. They showed that, provided that the threshold is not too low, a firm prefers to reformulate its product
to avoid the tax, leading to positive results for health and welfare. They also showed that prices are readjusted
after the introduction of the tax, even if a firm escapes the tax by modifying the nutrient content of her product.
Réquillart et al. (2016) studied how two competing firms, with each firm producing one good, react to various
nutritional policies. With excise tax proportional to the nutrient content of the product, they found that both the
nutrient content and the price of the two products sold on the market are affected by the tax. This result holds even
if the tax directly affects only one firm. In this case, the firm producing the low-quality good (that is, a good with
a high content of a nutrient that has an adverse effect on health) improves the quality of her good in order to pay a
lower tax and the firm producing the high-quality good (which does not pay any tax) decreases the quality of her
good. Overall, the tax increases welfare. These theoretical changes in the product recipe were observed for the
revised soda tax implemented in France.5 Thus, integrating the possibility for firms to reformulate their products is
1From 2010 to 2013 at least five countries have implemented taxes on unhealthy products, and since 2015, more than 10 countries and
several cities have enforced a tax on sugary drinks (Cornelsen and Smith, 2018).
2A well-known example is the Danish tax on fatty products (Jensen and Smed, 2013).
3The pass-through rate was larger than 1 in supermarket chains but lower than 1 (or even negative) in some independent shops.
4They found that the tax was fully transmitted in the case of sugary sweetened beverages (SSB) and over-shifted in the case of diet products.
In a previous study, Berardi et al. (2016) also found pass-through rates that depend on the type of beverages.
5The new soda tax is triggered at 3e per hectolitre for products containing less than 1g of added-sugar per 100ml of product. It in-
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crucial to be able to produce an accurate and relevant assessment of the tax; all the more so from the perspective of
assessing the consequences of the policy on health. If firms react to this ‘quality’ incentive by lowering the content
in the taxed nutrient, consumers’ nutrient intakes are affected whether consumers modify their consumption of
taxed products or not.
The aim of this study is to assess the effect of an (ex-ante) tax policy on key market outcomes, such as the
equilibrium prices, market shares, firm profits, and nutrient consumption, by integrating firms’ reactions to both
the prices and characteristics of products. While there are now a small number of works that endogenize how firms
are likely to modify their prices in response to taxation (Bonnet and Réquillart, 2013; Nesheim et al., 2018; Allais
et al., 2015; Dubois et al., 2018), to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study that integrates a change
in the characteristics of products that might result from taxation.6 In this paper, we assume an exogenous firms’
response in product quality to the tax. These changes consist of decreasing the content of the taxed nutrient so that
a firm can lower the level of the tax she must pay or even in some cases fully escape the tax. The proposed changes
are a priori beneficial for the firms, in the sense that the decrease in the amount of the per-unit tax is larger than
the cost increase, if any, to achieve product reformulation. However, we cannot claim that these changes in the
nutritional content of products are the changes that would occur at equilibrium.
Specifically, we develop a structural econometric model that integrates consumers substitution patterns and
accounts for competition between firms. The methodology is based on a four-step approach. First, we estimate
price and quality preferences of consumers for the differentiated products in the market, using a random coefficient
logit model. Second, a supply model is developed assuming price competition between firms. The model provides
estimates of the marginal cost and margin of each product. Third, using estimated marginal costs and input price
data, we estimate a cost model that is used to assess the cost change due to product reformulation. Finally, we
evaluate the impact of sugar taxation. Following Duvaleix-Tréguer et al. (2012), we assume that a product is
taxed if its sugar content is above a certain threshold, and the amount of the excise tax is proportional to the
creases gradually according to the added sugar content, reaching for example 23.5e per hectolitre for products containing 14 to 15g of added
sugar per 100ml of product. Several brands anticipated the change in the tax design and reduced the sugar content of their products (see
https://www.bfmtv.com/economie/sprite-7up-lipton-ice-tea-pourquoi-ces-sodas-contiennent-soudainement-moins-de-sucre-1490320.html)
6More generally there are very few empirical studies evaluating the impact of nutritional policies on the nutrient contents of food products,
except if the policy directly targets the nutrient content (e.g., product reformulation policies). An exception is Moorman et al. (2012), who
investigated how firms respond to standardized nutrition labels on food products required by the US Nutrition Labeling and Education Act.
They showed that firms did modify the characteristics of their products in response to the policy.
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product’s sugar content. We use the structural demand and supply model to determine and compare the new
market equilibrium in two different cases: one in which firms do not reformulate their products; and a second in
which firms do reformulate their products. In any case, firms strategically react in price to the taxation scheme, as
in Bonnet and Réquillart (2013).
The methodology is applied to evaluate the impact of taxation targeting products that are high in caloric
sweeteners in the French dessert market. In this market, we focus the analysis on compotes, yogurts, fromages
blancs/petits suisses (FBPS) and other dairy desserts (ODD). We choose the dessert market for different reasons.
First, these products are an important contributor to simple carbohydrate intakes, the consumption of which needs
to be reduced. In particular, yogurts and FBPS are the second major contributor of children’s carbohydrate intakes.
Second, there is room for product reformulation as, within each family of products, there is a large heterogeneity
in the sugar content of products. Third, these products are made of several ingredients in addition to the sweeten-
ers. This makes the analysis of product reformulation more interesting, in the sense that a reduction in the sugar
content from added caloric sweeteners of a product may be accompanied by an increase in the content of some
other nutrients, such as fat from milk or fructose from fruits. The net impact on health may be positive or negative,
depending on the product recipe changes.
We first analyze the potential impact of product reformulation, and show that reformulation is a potentially
important tool to decrease the intake of caloric sweeteners. Thus, we estimate that product reformulation would
lead to a decrease in the intake of caloric sweeteners by about 7%. Most of the effect comes from the mechanical
impact of the product reformulation whereas changes in demand and prices induced by product reformulation plays
a minor role. Then, we analyze the impact of taxation and show that firms’ price reactions amplify the potential
impact of the tax on the intake of caloric sweeteners. Thus, firms have an interest to over-transmit the price changes
to consumers as in Bonnet and Réquillart (2013). In some sense, they partly counterbalance the decrease in the
quantities sold by an increase in the per-unit margin, but by doing so, they amplify the decrease in consumption
leading to a larger impact of the tax on caloric sweetener intake. We also show that the industry facing the tax has
an interest in reformulating the products sold. Reformulation is a way for the industry to limit the negative impact
of taxation on their profits. By lowering the caloric sweetener content of their products, firms face lower taxes per
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unit of product and in some circumstances, and for some products, they fully escape the tax. Finally, we show
that taxation and reformulation act in the same direction; that is, to reduce the intake in the taxed nutrient. These
results have important consequences. From a research perspective, ignoring how firms might react to a tax policy
leads to a significant under-estimation of the potential impact of taxation on the consumption of taxed nutrients. In
our case, we show that ignoring the combined effect of strategic price reactions and product reformulation leads
to an underestimation of the impact of the tax on the intake in the taxed nutrient of 44%. From a policy-oriented
perspective, we conclude that a taxation scheme should be designed in order to favor product reformulation by
firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and provides a descriptive analysis of the
French dessert market. Section 3 describes the models and methods. Section 4 provides the results on demand and
supply. Section 5 provides the impacts on consumption, market equilibrium, profits of reformulation strategy, and
taxation scenario. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and dessert market
We use data from a French representative consumer panel data of 20,144 households collected by KANTAR World-
panel. This is a home-scan data set providing detailed information on all purchases of food products. In this work
we consider all purchases of desserts over the period January-May 2009, corresponding to more than 1,600,000
observations. In particular, quantities, prices, brands, and characteristics of goods are registered. The relevant
market is the whole dessert market, except ice cream; a rarely purchased product in France during the period of
time chosen accounting for less than 1% of the average dessert budget share over the period. Specifically, we
define four broad dessert categories as follows: yogurts (plain; sweetened; flavored; with fruits), FBPS (plain;
flavored;with fruits),7 ODD (cream desserts, ‘crême brulée’ desserts, coffee and chocolate mousses, style custard
flans, French rice puddings, Floating Island desserts8) and fruit compotes or stewed fruits.9 We classify yogurts,
and FBPS into brand, fat content, sugar content and flavor categories. We get 75 different yogurts and 41 different
7Fromage blanc is a creamy, soft, fresh, white cheese made with whole, semi-skimmed or skimmed milk. Petit suisse is creamy fresh
cheese, with a cylindrical shape, the fat and dry extract contents of which are regulated, often targeted for children.
8A classic French dessert that consists of meringue floating on a sea of vanilla custard
9We define three fat content categories: full-fat (more than 3% fat for yogurts, more than 5% fat for FBPS), semi-skimmed (between 1%
and 3% fat for yogurts, between 2% and 5% fat for FBPS), and skimmed (fat close to 0%); and three sugar content and flavor categories: plain,
sweet, flavored, and with fruits.
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Table 1: Average prices (e/kg) and market shares (%) by brands and product categories.
Product categories
Compotes Yogurts Fromages blancs, Other dairy
petits suisses desserts
Price MS Price MS Price MS Price MS
Firm 1
Brand 1 2.19 1.82 3.09 1.40 3.07 2.65
Brand 2 2.08 0.68 3.04 0.31 3.96 0.30
Brand 3 4.82 0.17
Brand 4 3.51 0.56
Brand 5 2.60 2.12 4.02 0.49
Firm 2
Brand 6 2.25 1.65 5.37 0.22 3.57 2.92
Firm 3
Brand 7 1.91 0.80 2.65 0.64 3.79 0.10
Brand 8 2.18 0.83
Brand 9 2.29 0.42
Firm 4
Brand 10 3.31 0.45 1.79 0.58 3.23 0.18 5.59 0.58
Firm 5
Brand 11 3.27 0.62 4.30 0.32
Firm 6
Brand 12 1.77 0.74 4.15 0.10 5.52 0.36
Brand 13 3.81 0.22 3.84 0.23
PL firms
PLs 2.31 3.06 1.74 6.27 2.38 3.96 2.40 8.07
All 2.62 4.04 2.20 15.91 2.90 6.44 3.27 12.46
The reported prices of a brand and a category is the weighted average (using market shares as weights) of the prices of this brand in this category over the
different retailers. MS stands for Market Shares.
FBPS. We have nine different compotes defined by function of brand and sugar content level.10 We distinguish 13
primary national brands (NBs), and one private label brand (PL). ODDs are only brand differentiated. Overall, the
household product set is composed of 159 differentiated products. Consumers can substitute the considered prod-
ucts with an alternative product, the so-called ‘outside option’, which includes other desserts (fruits and pastries),
as well as cheese that appears to substitute to dairy desserts in many cases. The outside option represents 61% of
the entire market on average.11
Table 1 reports weighted average prices and market shares for the four broad dessert categories by brands.
Compote, yogurts, FBPS, and ODD account for about 4%, 16%, 6%, and 12% of all dessert purchases, respectively.
10We define three sugar content categories: pure blended fruit without added sugar; low-added-sugar; and with-added sugar.
11The outside option also includes minor brands producing products from the four categories analyzed. All of these minor brands account
for only 2% of the whole market. Because we do not have precise information on these brands, we integrate them into the outside option.
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Table 2: Content in caloric sweeteners and sweetness index (taste) by brands and product categories (g /
100g of product).
Product categories
Compotes Yogurts Fromages blancs, Other dairy
petits suisses desserts
Content Taste Content Taste Content Taste Content Taste
Brand 1 9.6 9.6 9.2 9.2 20.0 20.0
Brand 2 6.4 10.3 4.9 7.5 11.2 17.7
Brand 3 5.1 9.1
Brand 4 7.5 11.0
Brand 5 9.7 11.1 8.4 8.4
Brand 6 9.1 10.6 10.0 11.6 16.2 16.4
Brand 7 11.5 11.5 5.6 5.6 16.9 16.9
Brand 8 11.2 13.9
Brand 9 12.2 12.2
Brand 10 14.1 14.1 9.9 9.9 4.7 4.7 14.9 14.9
Brand 11 14.5 14.5 13.7 13.7
Brand 12 9.8 10.5 4.7 4.7 17.1 17.1
Brand 13 7.1 7.1 12.1 12.1
PLs 14.6 14.6 9.6 10.7 6.9 7.0 16.6 16.6
Average 14.5 14.5 9.5 10.8 7.3 7.5 16.9 17.1
Min 10.7 1.5 0.0 11.2
First quartile 11.7 4.8 3.3 14.1
Median 14.4 10.7 4.5 16.2
Third quartile 17.3 13.2 12.6 18.0
Max 18.6 17.2 21.6 22.7
For each brand and product category, we report the weighted average content of sweetener computed over all the different products of a brand
Their respective average price per kg is e2.62, e2.20, e2.90, and e3.27. For each of the four product categories,
PL brands are the cheapest and have the highest market shares. This is a market feature that is now common for
many product categories and may be due to the fact that consumers no longer perceive large quality differences
between PL and NB products. Another feature of this market is the heterogeneity in NB product prices within each
category, except for NB compotes that are produced by two firms only. Yogurt prices are the highest for brands that
sell products reducing cholesterol (B3), probiotics (B4, B5), and soy milk (B13) yogurts. The other dairy dessert
prices range from e2.40 to e5.59 per kg. The high difference in prices is mainly due to the high heterogeneity of
the products (and consequently, the ingredient list) within the category.
Table 2 provides the caloric sweetener content (denoted ‘Content’ in the table) and an index of sweetness
(denoted ‘Taste’ in the table) of the different brands and product categories. The caloric sweetener content includes
both naturally present sweeteners, such as lactose in milk or fructose in fruits, and added caloric sweeteners, such
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as sugar or glucose. Except for compotes, there is a large heterogeneity in the mean caloric sweetener content of
brands. ODD have the highest content, 16.9% on average, ranging from 11 to 20% depending on the brand. Yogurts
and FBPS have the lowest mean contents, 9.5% and 7.3%, respectively. Finally, the average content of compotes
is 14.5%. Within a product category, and especially for yogurts and FBPS, we observe an important heterogeneity
of caloric sweetener content between products. This content in caloric sweetener will be used to determine (at the
product level) the tax rate that is applied to a given product. Because non-caloric sweeteners are also incorporated
into some products, we define an index which refers to the sweetness of the product. This index of sweetness
of a product is used in the analysis of demand as a proxy for the ’sugar’ taste of the product. For products that
contain only caloric sweeteners (85% of the products), the index is equal to the caloric sweetener content.12 For
products that contain some (or only) artificial sweeteners, we proxy their sweetness by the sweetness of a similar
product that does not contain any artificial sweetener. Artificial sweeteners are used mainly in the yogurt category
to enhance the sweetness of products that are low in sugar. On average, the taste index is greater than the content
in caloric sweetener for eight brands over the 13 brands of the yogurt category, and the difference, in some cases,
is greater than 50%. In most cases, brands with the lowest caloric sweetener content use artificial sweeteners. As
a consequence, the heterogeneity in taste is much lower than the heterogeneity in caloric sweetener content. Table
19 (in the Appendix) provides the fat content of the products. Compotes have virtually no fat (0.3% on average),
ODD are characterized by a large heterogeneity in fat content and have the highest content (5.6% on average),
followed by FBPS (3.9%), and lastly, yogurts (2.4%).
3 Models and methods
Our analysis is based on the following methodology. We first consider a flexible demand model to obtain the
price elasticities of demand for every product. The model needs to be as flexible as possible, and we therefore
opt for a random coefficient logit model (Berry et al., 1995; McFadden and Train, 2000). We estimate the model
using individual data and consider the unobserved heterogeneity of consumers. Second, we model the supply side
assuming an oligopolistic competition between manufacturers. The model provides estimates of marginal costs
12In theory, it should be the sum of the content in the different caloric sweeteners weighted by their respective sweetness. As we do not have
the content in the different sweeteners, we do not weight them by their respective sweetness.
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and margins. Third, using estimated marginal costs and input price data, we estimate a cost model that is used
to assess the cost change due to product reformulation. Finally, we present the simulation method used to assess
the impact of product reformulation and the impact of a tax policy on several market outcomes, such as the new
equilibrium prices, market shares, firm profits, and nutrient consumption.
3.1 The demand model: a random coefficient logit model
We use a random coefficient logit model to estimate the demand model and compute the related elasticities between
products. The indirect utility function Vi jt for consumer i buying product j, for j = 1, ...,Jt , in period t is given by:
Vi jt = βb( j)+
C−1
∑
c=1
γc( j)−αip jt +δSS j+δLL j+δSLS jL j+θNN j+θFFj+ εi jt
where βb( j) are brand fixed effects that capture (time-invariant) unobserved brand characteristics, γc( j) are category
fixed effects that represent (time-invariant) unobserved preferences for the categories, p jt is the price of product j
in period t, αi is the marginal disutility of price for consumer i, S j is the sugar taste of product j, and δS captures
consumer taste for sugar, L j is the lipid (fat) content of product j, and δL captures consumer preference for fat taste,
δSL captures consumer preference for fat and sugar taste, N j is a dummy related to the natural flavor of product j
and θN captures consumer taste for this characteristic, Fj is a dummy if product j contains fruits in dairy desserts
and θF captures consumer taste for this characteristic, and εi jt is an unobserved individual error term.
In our model, consumers can have a different price disutility; the αi varies across consumers. We assume that
the distribution of αi follows a normal distribution with mean α and standard deviation σα . We can then break
down the indirect utility into a mean utility δ jt = βb( j)+∑C−1c=1 γc( j)−α p jt+δSS j+δLL j+δSLS jL j+θNN j+θFFj
and a deviation from this mean utility µi jt = σανip jt , where νi captures unobserved consumer attributes. The
indirect utility is given by Vi jt = δ jt +µi jt + εi jt .
The consumer can decide not to choose one of the considered products. Thus, we introduce an outside option
that permits substitution between the considered products and a substitute. The utility of the outside good is
normalized to zero. The indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Vi0t = εi0t .
Assuming that εi jt is independently and identically distributed as an extreme value type I distribution, we are
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able to write the market share of product j at period t in the following way (Nevo, 2001):
s jt(θ) =
∫ exp(δ jt +µi jt)
1+∑Jtk=1 exp(δkt +µikt)
dPν(ν) (1)
where Pν is the cumulative normal distribution function of ν , and θ = (α,σ ,γ1, ...,γC−1,δS,δL,δSL,θN ,θF) is the
vector of demand parameters to be estimated.
The random coefficient logit model generates a flexible pattern of substitutions between products that is driven
by the different consumer price disutilities αi, such that, the own- and cross-price elasticities of the market share
s jt take the following forms:
∂ s jt
∂ pkt
pkt
s jt
=
{
− p jts jt
∫
αisi jt(1− si jt) dP(νi) if j = k
pkt
s jt
∫
αisi jtsikt dP(νi) otherwise,
(2)
where si jt stands for the probability that a consumer i chooses product j at time t.
3.2 Supply model
We consider F manufacturers that compete in prices on the dessert market. By doing so, we abstract from the role
of retailers in setting prices of NBs. We assume that the prices of PLs are chosen by a ‘specific’ manufacturer
representing the retailers price decisions. Formally, a manufacturer maximizes its profit:
Π ft = ∑
j∈G f
[Mt(p jt − c jt)s jt(p)]
where G f is the set of products that are sold by manufacturer f , Mt is the size of the market at time t, p jt is the final
price of product j at time t, c jt is the constant marginal cost to produce and sell product j at time t, s jt(p) is the
market share of product j at time t, given the vector of product price p. The first order conditions that determine
the prices of products are given by:
s jt(p)+ ∑
k∈G f
(pkt − ckt) ∂ skt∂ p jt = 0 ∀ j ∈ G f (3)
Using the above conditions, prices, and estimates of the demand model, we are able to recover margins of
manufacturers γ jt = p jt − c jt for each product j at time t and we note γt(p|θ) the vector of margins. We derive
estimates of the total marginal costs, c jt , which represent the marginal costs of production.
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3.3 Cost model
As the recipes change with product reformulation, so do the production costs. To infer the change in cost due to a
variation in inputs used, we specify a cost model that allow us to identify the average price paid by firms for the
main inputs. Only items belonging to the compote, yogurt, and FBPS categories are reformulated. The recipes of
items in the ODD category are assumed to remain constant, due to their various and complex recipes and because
of manufacturers’ uncertainty about consumers’ reaction to the reformulation of gourmet foods (Sebillotte, 2016).
We assume that the marginal cost of production c jt for product j at period t follows this linear function :
c jt = ρ0+ρSS j+ρYYj+ρFFj+ρCCo j+ τYPFYj+ τFYPFFYj+ τFPFFj+ωc( j)t +ωt(1−N j)+ωFrFr j+ϑ jt
(4)
where ρ0 represents a constant cost common to all products, S j is the sugar content of product j and ρS represent
the price of sugar paid by firms, Yj is the milk content of plain yogurt in the yogurt j and ρY is the price of milk in
plain yogurt 13, Fj is the milk content of plain FBPS in the FBPS j and ρF is the price of milk in plain FBPS 14,Co j
is the fruit content of the compote j and ρC is the price of fruits in compote, PFYj is the percentage of fixed other
ingredients in yogurt j and τY is the price of related fixed part, PFFYj is the percentage of fixed other ingredients
in yogurt j with fruits and τFY is the price of related fixed part, PFFj is the percentage of fixed other ingredients
in FBPS j and τF is the price of related fixed part, ωc( j)t are monthly fixed effects for each product category c of
product j, N j is a dummy variable related to the natural flavor of product j, ωt are the related coefficient that varies
across time period t, Fr j is a dummy if product j contains fruits, ωFr is the cost associated to the fruit dummy, and
ϑ jt is an error term.
When recipes change due to reformulation, the quantity of inputs S j, Yj, Fj and Co j varies and then a new
marginal cost is computed thanks to the estimated price of each input ρˆS, Y , ρˆF , and ρˆC, respectively. The new
marginal cost is given by c˜ jt = c jt +∆cinputs, j where ∆cinputs, j = ρˆS∆S j+ ρˆY∆Yj+ ρˆF∆Fj+ ρˆC∆Co j.
13Milk cost represents an important part of the cost of plain yogurt
14Milk cost represents an important part of the cost of plain FBPS
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3.4 Simulation method
We simulate the impact on prices and consumption of excise taxes or product reformulation, given the estimated
marginal costs, changes in recipes (if any) and input prices,s as well as the other estimated structural demand
parameters. The marginal cost of production is modified by the excise tax, but also by the cost of reformulation; that
is, the change in the inputs of item recipes (e.g., a decrease in added sugar, an increase in some other ingredients).
The profit-maximization program for firm f is now given by:
max
{pkt}k∈G f
∑
j∈G f
(p jt − c˜ jt)Mts jt(p) (5)
where c˜ jt = c jt + τ j+∆cinputs, j is the new marginal cost including the per-unit level of the tax τ j which depends
on the caloric sweetener content of product j and the reformulation costs ∆cinputs, j.15 The new price equilibrium
vector p∗t is deduced from the following program:
min{
p∗jt
}
j=1,..,Jt
‖p∗t − γt (p∗/θ)− c˜t‖
where ‖.‖ is the Euclidean norm in RJ , γt (p∗/θ) is the vector of manufacturer margins deduced from (5), and
the vector c˜t is the sum of the vectors of marginal costs obtained from (3), ct = (c1t , ..,c jt , ..,cJt), tax levels,
τ = (τ1, ..,τ j, ..,τJ), and input variations caused by reformulation, ∆cinputs = (∆cinputs,1, ..,∆cinputs, j, ..,∆cinputs,J).
4 Results on demand and supply
We estimated the demand model using household purchase data. For computational reasons, we randomly chose
100,000 observations among the 1,600,000 available to us. We used the simulated maximum likelihood method as
in Revelt and Train (1998) and a control function approach for identification issue (see details in the Appendix).
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the demand model. The first column shows the mean marginal utility
of product characteristics. The second column shows the estimated standard deviation of price. It is significant at
the 1% level, indicating that the marginal utility of price varies with unobservable household characteristics. As
expected, the probability of choosing an alternative falls with its price (-1.38). Households prefer compote more
than the three other dairy dessert categories, on average. They also prefer yogurt with fruit (0.81). Surprisingly, the
15The tax τ j is 0 for non-taxed products.
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Table 3: Results of the random coefficient logit model.
Random Coefficient Logit Model
Mean StD
Price -1.3798 (0.0001) 0.5198 (0.0000)
Compote -
Yogurt -2.2074 (0.0002)
FBPS -1.5548 (0.0001)
ODD -0.5896 (0.0001)
Fruit in Yogurt 0.8053 (0.0001)
Plain Yogurt and FF/PS -0.1004 (0.0001)
Sugar taste -0.0195 (0.0000)
Fat taste 0.0478 (0.0000)
Sugar taste* Fat taste 0.0080 (0.0000)
Error term 0.5603 (0.0001)
LL -246,356
Number of observations 100,000
Coefficients βb( j) not shown
Note: FBPS and ODD stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses, and other dairy desserts, respectively.
sweetness of a product decrease the household average utility. However, when integrating the interaction between
sugar and fat, for FBPS and ODD, given their high fat content, an increase in sugar content increases utility. The
same is not true for compote, the fat content of which is very low. This reflects the observed trend in the market
whereby consumers increasingly choose compotes with a low level of sugar. We also found that households prefer
fat products (0.05), even more so if they are sweetened.
Table 4: Aggregated own- and cross-price elasticities by product categories.
Compotes Yogurts FBPS ODD OG
Compotes -2.6361 0.1292 0.1328 0.1307 0.0993
Yogurts 0.4324 -1.9753 0.4290 0.4207 0.3555
FBPS 0.2303 0.2196 -2.6638 0.2328 0.1590
ODD 0.4928 0.4606 0.5075 -2.4572 0.2940
Note: FBPS, ODD, and OG stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses, other dairy desserts, and outside good, respectively.
Using the structural demand estimates, we compute price elasticities for each differentiated product. Table
4 provides aggregated own- and cross-price elasticities by categories.16 Own-price elasticities are close to -2.5,
except for yogurt products for which the demands are less elastic (about -2.0). Cross-price elasticities by food
16Computational details for aggregated elasticities are provided in Bonnet et al. (2018).
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Table 5: Average marginal costs (e/kg) and average margins (%) by brands and product categories.
Product categories
Compotes Yogurts Fromages blancs, Other dairy
petits suisses desserts
Cost Margin Cost Margin Cost Margin Cost Margin
Brand 1 1.34 48.2 2.01 36.9 1.91 37.8
Brand 2 1.11 46.9 1.97 37.7 2.65 33.0
Brand 3 3.50 31.7
Brand 4 2.30 34.7
Brand 5 1.62 40.8 2.70 32.9
Brand 6 1.42 42.1 4.05 28.7 2.71 32.9
Brand 7 1.35 46.7 1.73 36.5 2.69 32.9
Brand 8 1.31 40.8
Brand 9 1.38 39.7
Brand 10 2.24 32.5 1.15 48.5 2.22 33.1 4.09 28.1
Brand 11 2.29 31.6 3.24 29.1
Brand 12 1.38 49.8 3.25 30.0 4.11 28.2
Brand 13 2.71 30.5 2.68 29.9
PLs 1.41 39.8 0.92 50.1 1.51 38.9 1.74 39.5
All 1.66 37.6 1.26 46.0 1.86 37.2 2.17 36.8
Note: The reported marginal cost (margin) of a brand and a category is the weighted average (using market shares as weights) of the marginal
cost (margin) of products for each brand in each category.
category are also almost equal. There is no second-best product category following a price change in a given
dessert category. Consumers shift to another product proportionally to its initial market share. We also find that
consumers shift to the outside good to a lower extent . For each food category, cross price elasticities with the
outside good are lower than those with other product categories. At the brand level (Table 20 in the Appendix),
we find that yogurts are less elastic, except for three brands that are characterized by the lowest caloric sweetener
contents and, for two of them, high artificial sweetener contents.17 Consumers react more to a change in prices
for these expensive yogurts. For FBPS and ODD, we also find a heterogeneity in own-price elasticities for NB
products. Furthermore, in each category, PL products are less price sensitive than those of NBs, a result which is
commonly found.
From the supply model, we deduce the margins and marginal costs (see Table 5). Margins vary from 30% to
50%, and they are higher on average in the yogurt category. This is in line with the empirical literature which
typically finds margins in this range (Bonnet et al., 2016). For each product category, PLs have both the lowest
17The first brand specialized in soy products, the second in ‘probiotics’ products and the third in cholesterol lowering products.
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marginal cost and the highest percent margin. This latter result is consistent with the theoretical literature showing
that percent margins on PLs are likely to be larger than those on NBs (Mills, 1995). In each category, except ODD,
marginal costs of brands are, in most cases, similar. Larger marginal costs correspond to brands producing specific
products (Brands 3, 4, 13 for yogurt and 6 and 12 for FBPS). In the ODD category, the comparison of marginal
costs is more difficult as products are very heterogeneous.
Results on the cost model are provided in Table 13. The estimated sugar price ise521 per ton of sugar which is
in the range of market prices. Thus, in 2009, the average price of sugar in the EU ranges between 500 and 550 e/t
(European Commission, 2019). The estimated cost of milk content of plain yogurt is 504 e/t. Note that production
of a yogurt requires 1 to 1.2 litres of milk per kg of final product and that the farm gate price of milk was about
0.34 e/l in 2008 and 0.29 e/l in 2009. Finally, the ratio of matrix cost of FBPS and yogurt is 2.5 (1.261/0.504),
which is in line with the quantity of milk needed to produce a kilogram of final product.18
5 Results of simulations
We first simulate a specific product reformulation scenario without considering taxation (subsection 5.1), in order
to understand how and to what extent it impacts consumers’ average nutrient intakes and firms’ profit, by disen-
tangling its mechanical effect from the effects of consumers’ and firms’ reactions. Second, we study the impact of
taxation. The assumed tax scheme has one tier depending on the sugar content of products. That is, if the sugar
content of a given product is below a threshold, then the product is not taxed. If it is above the threshold, the
product is taxed. The chosen rate of taxation is e0.20 per 100 g of sugar.19 This tax scheme is in line with the
results from Duvaleix-Tréguer et al. (2012) who theoretically studied such a scheme and showed that, provided that
the threshold is not too low, firms prefer to reformulate their products in order to avoid the tax. They also showed
that such a policy might be welfare improving. However, setting a too high threshold is likely to reduce both the
number of taxed products and the number of reformulated products. As a consequence, it is likely to reduce the
potential health effects associated with a decrease in sugar intake by consumers. To better understand the impact
18Plain yogurt requires 1.212 litres of milk per kg of final product whereas fromages blancs
and petits suisses require 2.735 and 2.363 litres of milk per kg of final product respectively
(https://agriculture.gouv.fr/sites/minagri/files/documents/pdf/Coefficients_Techniques_Lait_cle8e1393.pdf). Therefore, FBPS requires
between 1.95 (2.363/1.212) and 2.26 ((2.735/1.212)) times more milk than yogurts.
19In practice, this rate leads to a roughly 10 to 20% price increase for taxed products.
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of the threshold on market outcomes, we first assess how sugar intakes and firms’ profits evolve with tax thresholds
(subsection 5.2). We finally discuss in depth a specific case of taxation (subsection 5.3) for highlighting economic
mechanisms.
5.1 The impact of product reformulation
The simulated product reformulation scenario consists of decreasing the quantity of added sugar to the minimum
level that is technically feasible while in ‘sensory’ sense, remaining acceptable for consumers. The assessed effects
can be considered as the upper bound of the impact of a product reformulation strategy. From a policy perspective,
the scenario can be viewed as an hypothetical policy in which the public health authorities would strongly push
firms to reduce their product’s sugar content, just as the British food industry is experiencing to some extent with
their childhood-obesity plan (Public Health England, 2017).20 The minimum added sugar content was estimated
for 18 product recipes using optimization models (see the Appendix for a detailed presentation of the methodology
and the models).21
We run three cases to decompose the potential impact of product reformulation. In the first case, we assume
constant market shares. Consumers continue to buy products as if there were no changes either in the flavor or
the price of products. This provides the mechanical impact of product reformulation, assuming no other changes.
We find that the intake of caloric sweetener decreases by 6.9 %, whereas fat intake slightly increases (+0.8 %) as,
for some products, the decrease in caloric sweetener content is accompanied by an increase in its fat content (see
Table 6, second column). As a consequence of the change in the intakes of caloric sweetener and fat, calorie intake
also decreases (-3.0 %) but to a lower extent than the caloric sweetener.
In the second case, we assume that prices remain constant but that consumers react to the change in the nutrient
composition of the products. Consumers know that products have been reformulated and thus reevaluate the
utility they get, given the modified product recipes. As shown in Table 3, both sugar and fat tastes do influence
the utility of consumption. Taking this effect into account leads to (very) small changes in consumption. The
20Public Health England challenged all sectors of the food industry in 2016 to reduce the amount of sugar in the foods that contribute most
to children’s intakes by 20% by 2020, by publishing guidelines for total sugar levels per 100g of products for these food categories.
21The 18 product recipes correspond to the following products: sweet, flavored or with fruit yogurt (skimmed, semi-skimmed or whole),
flavored or with fruit Greek style yogurt, skimmed flavored fromage blanc, fruit semi-skimmed or whole milk fromages blancs, petits suisses
with fruit with semi-skimmed or whole milk, compotes and diet compotes.
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Table 6: Reformulation: Change in nutrient intakes
Constant Constant Endogenous
market shares prices prices
∆ OG - -0.1 pp -0.0 pp
∆ caloric sweeteners -6.9% -6.7% -6.8%
∆ lipids +0.8% +0.3% 0.1%
∆ calories -3.0% -3.1% -3.2%
Note: pp stands for percentage point, that is the absolute variation of the outside good market share. OG stands for the outside good.
The percent change in nutrient intakes is computed over the initial intakes from the four product categories.
comparison with the previous case shows that consumers switch towards products with more sugar and less fat.
Thus, the decrease in caloric sweetener intake is a slightly lower, as well the increase in fat intake. This is mostly
explained by changes between the categories; in particular, a shift away from yogurts and FBPS, towards compotes.
Consumption adjustment benefits the whole industry as its aggregate market share increases, though to a very small
extent.
Finally, in the third case, we allow producers to modify prices as both the demand for the different products
and production costs have changed. Production costs of compotes slightly decrease (by less than 1 ecent /kg),
those of yogurts are unchanged, and those of FBPS slightly increase (by less than 1 ecent /kg). Prices are adjusted
but at a very small proportion. As in the previous case, there is a switch towards products with lower fat and higher
sugar, mostly due to a shift away from FBPS towards compotes. The market share of compotes increases by 3.3
%, whereas those of yogurts and FBPS decrease by 0.2 % and 1.6%, respectively (not shown). These changes in
market share impact firms’ profits. Thus, the profit of the compote producers increases by 3.8%, whereas profits
of yogurts and FBPS decrease by 0.3% and 1.5%, respectively. The profit of ODD is almost unaffected. Finally,
the profit of the whole industry remains unchanged as the gains of compotes producers offset the losses of yogurt
and FBPS producers.
From the three simulations, we conclude that the main impact of product reformulation on nutrient intakes is
mechanical. Adjustments in demand due to the change in product recipes and firms’ price reactions play a minor
role in our setting.
17
5.2 The impact of tax threshold levels on sugar intakes and firms’ profits
We now analyze the impact of taxation, assuming that firms reformulate their products. We have assumed that each
firm would decrease the content of added sugar to just below the tax threshold to fully escape the tax.22 When this
reduction cannot be technically implemented by the manufacturer, we fix the quantity of added sugar of the product
to the minimum level feasible, in order for firms to mitigate the tax. Figure 1 displays how sugar intakes vary with
tax threshold levels.23 Overall, the lower the thresholds, the larger the decrease in sugar intakes. However, the
change in sugar intake is not linear with threshold levels. For a given level of compote threshold, increasing the tax
threshold for dairy desserts from 6 to 10g of sugar per 100g of product has a relatively small impact on sugar intake
(a less than 0.5 percentage point difference per 1g increase in the threshold). In contrast, when the threshold for
dairy desserts increases from 10g to 16 g/100g, the impact on sugar intake is large (approximately a 2 percentage
point difference per 1g increase in the threshold). We also observe a non-linear response in sugar intake to a change
in the compote threshold holding constant the dairy desserts threshold.24
Figure 1: Changes in sugar intake in function of the levels of tax thresholds (with reformulation)
Figure 2 shows how firms’ profits vary with tax thresholds levels assuming firms reformulate their products
(solid lines) or not (dashed lines). Two main results emerge. First, the negative impact of taxation on firms’ profits
depends on the tax thresholds. A lower threshold leads to higher losses for the firms. However, the marginal
22Note that this scenario of product reformulation is slightly different from the previous one.
23Product reformulation also leads to slight increases in the fat content of reformulated products, except for compotes which have almost
zero fat content. They are not shown as the changes are very small.
24For a given threshold for dairy desserts, for example, 10g/100g, the change in sugar intake is much larger when the compote threshold
increases from 12 to 14 g/100g than when the compote threshold increases from 14 to 16 g/100g.
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Figure 2: Variation of industry’s profits for different levels of tax thresholds (12, 14 and 16g/100g) for compotes
in function of the level of the tax thresholds for dairy desserts (without or with reformulation)
impact on profit of a change in the threshold is not constant. For example, at a given threshold for compotes, the
marginal impact of modifying the threshold for dairy desserts is small for ‘low’ values of threshold (in the range 6
to 10 g/100g) and much higher for ‘high’ values of the threshold (in the range 10 to 18 g/100g). We also observe a
similar but opposite result for compote threshold (at a given threshold for dairy desserts). The variations of profits
are almost identical for the high values of the compote threshold (from 16 to 14 g/100g) whereas the variation of
profits is higher for low values of the compote threshold (from 14 to 12 g/100g). This result comes mainly from
the following mechanism: a change in the tax threshold affects the number of products that are taxed but not the
level of the tax for taxed products. The higher the threshold, the lower the number of taxed products. Therefore,
when the threshold decreases, more and more products are taxed, explaining why firms’ profits decrease. The
evolution of firms’ profits in function of tax threshold level depends on the distribution of sugar content among the
products. Second, Figure 2 shows that firms have an interest in reformulating their products. The (negative) impact
of taxation is lower when they reformulate their products. This means that the cost of reformulation is lower than
the gain from reformulation. The gain mainly comes from a mechanical decrease (or a full escape of the tax when
it is technically possible to lower the sugar content to just below the threshold) in the amount of the tax, resulting
from the reformulation.
Figure 3 provides the impact of taxation on firms’ profits by product category, assuming that firms reformulate
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Figure 3: Firms’ profits in function of the dairy dessert tax threshold
Note: the compote tax threshold is 12g/100g; firms reformulate their products. FBPS and ODD stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses
and other dairy desserts, respectively.
their products, and for a fixed tax threshold for compotes (12g/100g of product). In order to analyze the impact of
taxation on profits by the categories of products it is necessary to consider the following: first, a direct effect (that
is, the extent of taxation for the category of product); and second, an indirect effect (that is, the extent of taxation
on the categories of products which are substitutes). For compotes, the direct impact of taxation does not change
with the threshold for dairy desserts, since its level is fixed. The decrease in their profits when the threshold for
dairy desserts increases is thus only due to the indirect effect. Thus, when the threshold increases, fewer products
from their competitors are taxed, and as a consequence, the profit of compote producers is negatively impacted
(that is, compote producers benefit less from substitutions). For ODDs, when the tax threshold increases, losses
from taxation first slightly increase and are significantly reduced above 14g/100g. When the threshold is low, the
indirect effect is at stake. Nonetheless, for higher values of the thresholds, the direct effect plays a role as some
products escape the tax (the content and distribution in caloric sweetener of ODD is provided in Table 2), thus
reducing the impact of the tax on their profits. Finally, for both yogurts and FBPS, the profits exhibit inverted
U-shape curves when the tax threshold increases. Thus, when the tax threshold increases, they mainly benefit
from the direct effect; that is, more and more products escape the tax, but for larger values of the thresholds, the
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indirect impact plays an important role as some products from the ODD category are no longer taxed. Note that
globally, FBPS producers benefit from the tax which is due to the fact that their competitors are taxed whereas only
a fraction of their products is taxed. The latter category has a lower content in caloric sweeteners than the other
dairy dessert categories (see Table 2).
5.3 Supply and demand mechanisms
We now detail the supply and demand mechanisms at stake. The analysis is conducted with a tax threshold for
compote equal to 12g/100g of sugar and 8g/100g of sugar for dairy desserts. We choose these thresholds as they
lead to a significant decrease in sugar intake from these four product categories. The amount of the tax ise 0.20 per
100g of sugar. Firms reformulate their products, as assumed in the previous sub-section. Table 7 reports both the
share of taxed products and the amount of the tax by brand and product category.25 Given the assumed tax scheme,
only a subset of products is taxed. Almost two thirds of compotes, more than half of yogurts and a third of FBPS
are taxed. All ODD are taxed. Brands with a high average sugar content have more products taxed than brands
with a low average sugar content. This results in a strong disparity in the shares of taxed products between brands,
mostly for yogurt and FBPS categories. Although yogurts are on average sweeter than FBPS, the average amount
of the tax (computed over taxed products only) for yogurts (e0.21/kg) is lower than that for FBPS (e 0.24/kg).26
A few brands fully escape the tax: two brands of yogurts and one of FBPS. Compotes and ODD, which are the
sweetest products (see Table 2), support the highest levels of the tax.
We found that firms choose to pass more than the tax to consumers (see Table 21 in the Appendix). The prices
of taxed products increase by about 20% more than the amount of the tax. This result is in line with analyses of
taxation in other food product categories, such as sugar sweetened beverages, butter and margarine, and fresh dairy
products (Bonnet and Réquillart, 2013; Nesheim et al., 2018; Allais et al., 2015). The prices of non-taxed products
are also slightly modified, between -0.1% and +0.3% (not shown). Table 8 provides the average price change for
each brand in each category. Within a product category, brands experience rather heterogeneous price increases.
For example, in the yogurt category, some brands (brands 2 and 3) do not experience a change in price whereas the
25For a brand, the reported share of taxed products is computed as the ratio, in percent, of the market share of taxed products and the total
market share of the brand. The reported amount of the tax is a weighted average tax of taxed products, using market shares as weights.
26This comes from the fact that only a subset of products are taxed. Among this subset of taxed products, FBPS products are sweeter than
yogurts.
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Table 7: Taxation with product reformulation: Share of taxed products (%) and tax level (e/kg) by brand
and product category
Compotes Yogurts FBPS ODD
Share Tax Share Tax Share Tax Share Tax
Brand 1 50 0.21 47 0.26 100 0.40
Brand 2 0 0 100 0.22
Brand 3 0
Brand 4 29 0.21
Brand 5 51 0.24 49 0.22
Brand 6 35 0.23 52 0.29 100 0.32
Brand 7 85 0.22 14 0.27 100 0.34
Brand 8 70 0.21
Brand 9 100 0.16
Brand 10 27 0.27 59 0.24 19 0.21 100 0.30
Brand 11 65 0.28 100 0.27
Brand 12 69 0.22 19 0.19 100 0.34
Brand 13 61 0.19 100 0.24
PLs 68 0.26 57 0.22 36 0.22 100 0.33
All 62 0.27 53 0.21 35 0.24 100 0.31
Note: A proportional tax of e0.20 per 100g of sugar is implemented when sugar content is above 12g for compote and 8g for other product
categories. The amount of the tax is computed over taxed products only. FBPS and ODD stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses, and
other dairy desserts, respectively.
price of some other brands increases by e0.19 (brand 9) or e0.23 (brand 7). Thus, for a brand, the average change
in price depends on both the change in price of the taxed products and the share of taxed products within the brand.
Within a product category, brands that experience the lowest price increase are those that have the lowest share of
taxed products.
Table 8 also presents the impact of the tax on consumers. All product categories lose market shares, but in
very different proportions. FFBS is almost not impacted with a 0.5% decrease in its market share whereas ODD
loses one fourth of its initial market share. Compotes and yogurts lose 7.2% and 5.2% of their market shares,
respectively. Overall, the tax scheme implemented leads to a change in the market shares of the different products
at the expense of products high in sugar and in favor of products low in sugar. Market shares of a few brands
increase. This is the case for brand 10 on the compote market, brands 2, 3, and 4 for yogurts, and brands 2, 7,
10 and 12 for FBPS. The brands that support the lowest level of taxes benefit from both intra- and inter-category
substitutions. PLs lose more than the average NBs, despite quite similar levels of tax, which is a consequence of a
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Table 8: Taxation with product reformulation: Changes in average price (e/kg) and market share (%) across
brands and product categories
Compotes Yogurts FBPS ODD
Price MS Price MS Price MS Price MS
Brand 1 0.13 -4.2 0.16 -4.7 0.49 -31.2
Brand 2 0 9.7 0 10.5 0.28 -12.8
Brand 3 0 11.3
Brand 4 0.07 4.9
Brand 5 0.15 -4.6 0.14 -0.9
Brand 6 0.10 -0.1 0.21 -6.2 0.41 -21.2
Brand 7 0.23 -14.2 0.05 5.2 0.42 -22.7
Brand 8 0.17 -8.3
Brand 9 0.19 -7.7
Brand 10 0.09 5.9 0.17 -8.5 0.06 5.4 0.39 -14.0
Brand 11 0.22 -7.6 0.34 -15.5
Brand 12 0.18 -10.1 0.05 8.0 0.44 -16.4
Brand 13 0.15 -1.6 0.30 -14.7
PLs 0.21 -9.5 0.15 -7.5 0.10 -1.0 0.40 -26.7
All 0.20 -7.2 0.14 -5.2 0.11 -0.5 0.41 -25.0
Note: A proportional tax of e 0.20 per 100g of sugar is implemented when the sugar content is above 12g for compote and 8g for other
product category. The reported change in price of a brand and a category is the weighted average (using market shares as weights) of the
change in price of all products from this brand in this category. FBPS and ODD stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses, and other dairy
desserts, respectively.
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Table 9: Variation of firms profits due to taxation whether firm product reformulation is assumed or not (in
%)
Product categories Total
Compotes Yogurts FBPS ODD
Reformul Without With Without With Without With Without With Without With
Firm 1 -0.3 +0.2 +0.7 -0.2 -22.3 -23.1 -6.2 -6.5
Firm 2 -3.3 +1.6 0.3 -3.6 -14.7 -15.5 -9.8 -8.9
Firm 3 -11.7 -6.4 +7.1 +6.2 -16.4 -17.2 -7.3 -3.8
Firm 4 -7.4 +7.4 -6.7 -5.8 +7.0 +6.6 -7.8 -8.5 -6.0 -2.5
Firm 5 -6.9 -3.8 -9.1 -9.9 -7.3 -5.1
Firm 6 -3.2 -3.2 +7.9 +7.2 -10.0 -10.7 -5.9 -6.3
Firm 7 -11.0 -5.8 -6.6 -5.2 +1.3 +0.6 -20.3 -21.1 -10.8 -10.0
All -9.7 -3.6 -4.6 -2.8 +1.8 +0.9 -18.1 -18.9 -8.8 -7.9
Note: A proportional tax of e 0.20 per 100g of sugar is implemented when sugar content is above 12g for compote and 8g for other product
categories. Columns ‘without’ indicate the change in profits when firms do not reformulate their products, and columns ‘with’ when firms do
reformulate their products. FBPS and ODD stand for fromages blancs and petits suisses, and other dairy desserts, respectively.
larger relative price effect of taxes, when evaluated in percentage change.27
Table 9 provides the impact of taxation on firms’ profits when firms can reformulate (column ‘with’) or not
(column ‘without’).28 When firms reformulate their products, the profit of the industry decreases by almost 8%.
Losses mainly come from the ODD category which experiences a 19% decrease in its profits related to the large
drop in market share (-25%). Because firms increase their mark-ups (recall that the pass-through rate is greater
than 100%), the loss in profit is lower than the loss in market share. This mechanism also explains why the profit
of the FBPS category slightly increases (+0.9%), whereas its market share slightly decreases (-0.5%). Profit losses
for compote and yogurt categories remain moderate (-3.6% and -2.8%, respectively). Given that firms are involved
in several product categories, all firms register losses, even if the profits coming from the FBPS category increase
for five firms among the six producing FBPS.
When firms cannot reformulate their products in response to the tax, the impact of taxation on profits of the
industry is larger but remains in the same order of magnitude (-8.8% compared to -7.9% with product reformula-
tion), as shown in Figure 2. However, a scenario without reformulation is better for ODD and FBPS. In the case of
ODD, which by assumption cannot reformulate their products, the lower loss in profits is due to the fact that their
27NB prices increase by 12%, 12%, 11%, and 12% for compotes, yogurts, FBPS, and ODD, respectively, whereas PL prices increase by
13%, 15%, 12% and 17% respectively. The price transmission of the tax is slightly lower for PLs than NBs, but this is not sufficient to avoid a
larger decrease in market shares (see Table 21).
28As shown in Table 1, firm 1 owns brands 1 to 5, firm 2 owns brand 6, firm 3 owns brands 7 to 9, firm 4 owns brand 10, firm 5 owns brand
11, and firm 6 owns brands 12 and 13.
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(imperfect) substitutes experience a higher level of taxation. As discussed in Section 5.2, product reformulation
is a way for firms to decrease the tax rate (see Table 22 in the Appendix). For the other categories, the difference
of profit losses between the two cases results from two effects that go in opposite directions: the indirect effect,
already discussed for ODD, which depends on how rivals’ firms are taxed, and the direct effect which depends on
how the tax rate of a firm is affected by reformulation. The net effect relies on the strength of the two forces. In
the case of compotes and yogurts, the direct effect is greater than the indirect effect. As a consequence, profit with
production reformulation is larger than profits without reformulation. In the case of FBPS, this is the contrary.
These results show that considering substitution effects between product categories, and between taxed and non-
taxed products, and the potential firms’ efforts to escape the tax, are the key issues when evaluating the impact of
taxation policies (e.g., see Finkelstein et al. (2013)).
As expected, the taxation policy, assuming reformulation is possible, leads to a decrease (23%) in the intake
of caloric sweetener from the four product categories considered (see Table 10). This large decrease is partly due
to the reallocation of market shares within product categories and between product categories, as shown above.
However, it is also a consequence of a loss of market shares of the four categories, whereby the total market share
decreases by 3.7 percentage points. Taking into account the increase in the market share of the outside good, the
decrease in caloric sweetener intake is 13.5%. However, the net impact on calories is slightly positive (0.8%),
since the calorie content of the considered outside good is much higher than the average calorie content of the
four product categories considered. If we disregard substitution to the outside good, calories intake from the four
categories decreases by 17.7%.29
We also assess to what extent the modelling assumptions affect the estimated impact of the policy on the change
in caloric sweetener intakes. Table 11 provides a comparison of the changes in nutrients intake for three alternative
modelling assumptions. The first case refers to passive pricing and no reformulation of products. This is a frequent
assumption made to evaluate the impact of taxation. The second case refers to strategic pricing without product
reformulation. Last, the third case refers to strategic pricing and product reformulation. Given the characteristics of
this market and the tax scheme, assuming passive pricing and no reformulation, we estimate that taxation induces a
29The reported percent changes in nutrient intakes including or not the change in the outside good market share cannot be directly compared
as they are computed over the initial intakes of the considered market; that is, the J products for the four categories and the J+1 products when
the outside good is included.
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Table 10: Taxation with product reformulation: Changes in caloric, fat, and sugar intakes
Intake from the four product categories
Calories -17.7%
Lipids -14.2%
Caloric sweetener -22.9%
Total intake from the desserts including the outside good
Outside good (market share) +3.7 pp
Calories +0.8%
Lipids +3.5%
Caloric sweetener -13.5%
Note: pp stands for percentage point. The percent change in nutrient intakes is computed over the initial intakes of the considered market (i.e.,
over the nutrient intakes from the four product categories in the top of the table and over the whole intake of nutrients from desserts for the
second part of the table).
decrease in caloric sweetener intake by about 16%. Considering strategic pricing leads to an estimated decrease by
almost 19%. Finally integrating both strategic pricing and product reformulation leads to an estimated decrease in
the caloric sweetener content by 23%. In other words, ignoring strategic pricing and product reformulation leads
to under-estimate the impact of the tax by more than 44% in the relative term.
Table 11: Impact of alternative modelling assumptions on the nutrient intake from the four product cate-
gories
Passive pricing Strategic pricing Strategic pricing
No reformulation no reformulation reformulation
∆ caloric sweetener -15.9% −18.7% -22.9%
∆ lipids -12.3% −14.9% -14.2%
∆ calories -13.5% -16.0% -17.7%
6 Discussion
This paper provides a methodology for assessing the impacts of tax policies on food consumption, taking into
account manufacturers pricing strategies and possible changes in the characteristics of taxed products. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first empirical paper incorporating the reformulation of products in response to a tax
policy. According to our results, ignoring the combined effect of price reactions and product reformulation leads
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us to greatly under-estimate the impact of taxes on the intake of taxed nutrients. In our case, integrating these two
effects in the analysis, there is a change in the estimated decrease in caloric sweetener intake of 44 %.
In our setting, reformulation is exogenous. We assume that in response to the tax, firms set the caloric sweetener
content of their products slightly below the tax threshold, in order to fully escape the tax and, when this is not
possible, to the minimum level technically feasible. The reformulation scenario is in some sense conservative as it
uses as constraints what is observed on the market. For a given type of a product (e.g., ‘sweet yogurt’) the content
of sweetener of a reformulated product will not be lower than the observed value of a product available on the
market. As a consequence, we do not explore further reduction. Reformulation is exogenous but we show that
most firms gain by reformulating their products, as does the industry as a whole. Thus, reformulating a product is
a way to partially or fully escape the tax, the level of which depends on the sweetener content of the product. Even
if product reformulation lowers the impact of the tax on prices, and as a consequence lowers the impact of the tax
on consumption, we show that it increases the overall impact of the tax on the consumption of the taxed nutrient.
That is, the intake of the taxed nutrient (which has a deleterious impact on health) decreases more when firms
reformulate their products than when they do not. This is because the content of the taxed nutrient has decreased.
However, in our setting, product reformulation is not endogenous and we cannot claim that the case in which all
firms reformulate their products is an equilibrium (in terms of characteristics). Modelling how firms endogenously
adjust the set of products they offer would involve adding a second stage in the supply model in which firms
simultaneously choose product offerings, with the understanding that their actions and their rivals’ actions will
impact demand and mark-up. Firms would solve the problem by calculating the equilibrium profits they would
be likely to achieve under any possible set of product offerings, found in the second stage, and then choose the
products that would maximize those profits. We leave these developments to future research.
Some of our results depend on the choice of the outside good; in particular, the overall impact of the scenarios
on nutrients intake depends on the choice of the outside option. For example, in this study, the outside option
is highly caloric (much more so than the considered dessert products), and consequently, the overall impact of
taxation on calorie intake is not negative. Thus, some of the results need to be interpreted with some caution.
In addition, we do not consider that firms can reformulate their products by substituting a caloric sweetener
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with a non-caloric sweetener so as to keep the sweetness of the product constant. Evaluating this reformulation sce-
nario would involve estimating consumer preferences for non-caloric sweeteners in the demand model. However,
only 14 products out of 159 contain non-caloric sweeteners, making it difficult to estimate non-caloric sweetener
preference, and suggesting that this reformulation scenario may not yet be credible for the dessert market.
Our results also suggest that designing tax schemes that favor product reformulation is very important for the
success of a tax policy. This has already been put into effect in some countries. For example, France has revised its
‘soda tax’ design. Originally the tax did not depend on the sugar content of the product (and amounted to e0.075
/l). The tax was redesigned in July 2018 as a tiered-tax rate that varies according to the sugar content of a sugar
sweetened beverage.30
There are other debates about taxes that are not covered in this paper. In particular, we do not discuss possible
regressivity of the taxes, and more generally, the redistributive effects of such taxes versus their corrective effects.
Recently Allcott et al. (2019) showed that ‘an optimal commodity tax depends on two terms: the corrective benefits
and the regressivity costs’.
30In 2020, the tax is e0.038 per litre for products containing less than 1g of added sugar per 100ml, which progressively increases to above
e0.24 per litre for products containing 15g of added sugar per 100ml, and e0.205 per each gram per 100ml added above 15g (Service public,
2018)
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7 Appendix
7.1 Identification of demand estimates
This method relies on the assumption that all product characteristics are independent of the error term εi jt . How-
ever, assuming εi jt = ξ jt+ ei jt where ξ jt is a product-specific error term varying across periods and ei jt is an
individual-specific error term, the independence assumption cannot hold if unobserved factors included in ξ jt (and
hence in εi jt ) such as promotions, displays, and advertising are correlated with observed characteristics X jt . For
instance, we do not know the amount of advertising expenditure that firms incur each month for their brand. This
effect is thus included in the error term because advertising might play a role in the choice of products by house-
holds. As advertising is an appreciable share of production costs, it is obviously correlated with prices. To solve the
problem that omitted product characteristics might be correlated with prices, we use a control function approach,
as in Petrin and Train (2010). We then regress prices on instrumental variables (Wjt ) and the exogenous variables
X j of the demand equation :
p jt =Wjtγ+X jµ+η jt
where η jt is an error term that captures the remaining unobserved variations in prices. The estimated error term
η̂ jt of the price equation includes some omitted variables such as advertising variations and promotions that could
explain price variations across products and time periods. Introducing this term in the mean utility of consumers
δ jt allows us to capture unobserved product characteristics varying across time. Prices are now uncorrelated with
the new product-specific error term varying across periods (ζ jt = ξ jt −λη̂ jt ). We then write
δ jt = βb( j)+
C−1
∑
c=1
γc( j)−α p jt +δSS j+δLL j+δSLS j×L j+θNN j+θFFj+λη̂ jt +ζ jt
where λ is the estimated parameter associated with the estimated error term of the first stage.
In practice, we use BLP’s instruments as the total number of competing products offered by the other manu-
facturers in each category, the percentage of fruit products and plain products, and the average sugar taste offered
by the other manufacturers in each category. Table 12 shows the results of the estimation of the price regression.
All instrumental variables are significant and the F-test amounts to 12.08, meaning that the instrumental variables
are not weak.
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Table 12: Results on price equation
Mean (Ste)
Instrumental variables
Distance of competing products
Fruit 4.22 (1.18)***
Nature 7.87 (1.23)***
Sugar content 0.55 (0.10)***
Number of competing products 0.08 (0.02)***
Exogenous variables of the utility function
Compote -
Yogurt -4.87 (1.46)***
FBPS -1.65 (0.79)***
ODD -2.02 (0.73)***
Fruit 0.20 (0.13)
Nature 0.62 (0.19)***
Taste: sweetness 0.11 (0.02)***
Taste: fat 0.11 (03)***
Interaction sweetness x fat 0.00 (0.00)
R2 0.93
IV F-test 12.08 (0.00)
Number of observations 791
Coefficients βb( j) not shown
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7.2 Identification of the cost model
Table 13: Results on cost equation
Mean (Ste)
Input variables
Constant 1.473 (0.355)***
Sugar 0.521 (0.237)***
Milk for Yogurt 0.504 (0.163)***
Milk for FBPS 1.261 (0.329)***
Compote 0.374 (0.355)***
Other ingredients (fixed)
for yogurt 0.637 (0.978)
for yogurt with fruits 0.843 (1.229)
for FBPS 1.037 (0.394)***
Control variables
Fruit fixed effect not shown
Percentage of other ingredients not shown
Monthly fixed effect by product category not shown
Monthly fixed effect for no-nature products not shown
Number of observations 791
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7.3 Method of reformulation
Exogenous firms’ reactions in product recipe to the tax have been considered for yogurts, FBPS and compotes.
ODD recipes are assumed to remain constant, due to their various and complex recipes and because of manufactur-
ers’ uncertainty about consumer’s reaction to gourmet foods reformulation (Sebillotte, 2016). In order to establish
realistic quality response scenarios, the recipe and the minimum amount of added sugar technologically feasible
for firm and sensory acceptable by consumers had to be determined for each yogurt, FBPS and compote.
Step 1: Recipe assessment
Because product nutritional information necessary to assess recipe is not reported in the Kantar database, we
determined the recipe of each product using the list of ingredients and nutrition fact label collected by Oqali
database.31 Products collected by Kantar were then matched to those of Oqali. We used compotes and fruit purees,
and milk products Oqali datasets, built in 2009. We documented product characteristics for 476 marketed yogurts,
183 FBPS and 408 compotes and fruit purees. These data were completed by carrying out an Internet research for
products not collected by Oqali. This concerned 67 additional products.
The amount of added sweeteners (sugar, glucose syrup, ...) is missing information. It has been estimated for
each product, using the list of ingredients and nutrition facts label which provide the total amount of sweeteners.
We have also estimated the amount of sugar substitutes in case of food reformulation (plain dairy product or fruit
purees, depending on the type of products). In some cases, some realistic hypotheses based on the usual recipe of
the product or its ingredients had to be made. When the information displayed on the packaging was not sufficient
to assess the recipe without making strong assumptions, the recipe was not estimated and its characteristics have
not been taken into account when aggregating data at the group of products’ level (see step 3). This is the case for
only a few products.
Step 2: Computation of the minimum amount of added sugar
31Oqali is the French Food Observatory. Its implementation has been entrusted to a research institute, INRAE (French National Research
Institute for Agriculture, Food and Environment) and to a food safety agency, ANSES (French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occu-
pational Health and Safety). It aims to monitor changes in processed foods’ supply available on the French market, by measuring nutritional
quality evolution, over time (nutritional composition and labelling information). To this end, data on food products characteristics are collected,
and a database has been specifically designed to monitor changes in food products over time.
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The minimum amount of added sugar used to determine reformulation scenario has then been estimated for
each of the following 18 recipes:
• sweet yogurt with skimmed, semi-skimmed, or whole milk;
• flavored yogurt with skimmed, semi-skimmed, or whole milk, and flavored Greek yogurt;
• fruit yogurt with skimmed, semi-skimmed, or whole milk and fruit Greek yogurt;
• fruit petits suisses with semi-skimmed, or whole milk;
• flavored fromages blancs with skimmed milk;
• fruit fromages blancs with semi-skimmed, or whole milk; and
• compotes, diet compotes.
To this end, we considered that each recipe consists of three main ingredients:
• the sweetening ingredients. Different sweeteners can be used to cook the product. Sugar is the most common
but glucose syrup, inverted sugar and other types of sweetening ingredients can also be used. To simplify,
we considered that sugar is the only sweetener used in the case of food reformulation;
• a matrix ingredient, which is a substitute to the sweetening ingredients in the case of food reformulation.
The matrix ingredient is plain yogurt, fromages blancs or petits suisses for dairy products and fruit puree for
compotes.32 In the case of reformulation, the matrix ingredients substitute an equal amount of sweetening
ingredients; and
• a fixed ingredient for which quantity remains constant. This corresponds to the aroma used in flavored
yogurts or fruits for fruit yogurts, for example.
In order to determine the minimum amount of sugar to be used in a given product, we applied an optimization
model. We minimized the proportion of sweetening ingredients ys subject to the technical constraints of formula-
tion, such as product sweetness, texture or other constraints related to manufacturing. Constraints are defined in
Table 14. The limit values of constraint were derived from our matched Oqali Kantar dataset, by neglecting the
extreme observations corresponding to very specific recipes. Table 15 reports those extrema and the values set to
32For soy products, we considered plain soy yogurt as the matrix ingredient. The change in the nutritional composition of soy products,
before and after reformulation, takes into account the specific composition of the soy matrix. Nevertheless, when assessing production cost
variations, we assume the cost of this soy matrix to be the same as that of dairy yogurt.
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calibrate the optimization models for the 18 recipes. Ingredient characteristics used in the constraints are shown
in table 16. The optimization models were solved using Simplex LP Solving method of Excel Solver, except for
fruit dairy products for which we ran the non-linear GRG algorithm, starting from different sets of initial values in
order to make sure the solution is not a local optimum. The calculated minimum amount of sugar are reported in
Table 17.
Step 3: Aggregation into the 159 groups of products
For computational reasons, we had to limit the number of products considered in the demand model. Individ-
ual marketed products were thus aggregated into 159 groups of products based on their type (yogurts, fromages
blancs, petits suisses, compotes, dairy desserts), brand, aroma (plain, sweetened, flavored, fruits), and nutritional
composition (fat and sugar contents). For example, whole milk yogurts with fruits of a particular brand that cor-
respond to one group of products in this study, include several individual marketed products such as strawberry
yogurts, pineapple yogurts,and so on, that can be sold as part of a pack of four yogurts, or eight yogurts, etc. Mean
nutritional composition was computed for the 159 groups of products, taking into account the market shares of the
marketed products. The average amounts of sweetening, matrix ingredients and minimum amount of sugar were
also completed for the products for which firms quality reactions are considered. Tables 18 and 19 provide the
mean contents in caloric sweeteners and fat, before and after reformulation, by brands and product categories.
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Table 14: Technical constraints of formulation
Constraint Description Mathematical transcription
Texture In order to obtain a satisfying texture, the
dry extract of the product has to be in a cer-
tain scale of values
B− ≤ (Bm∗ym+Bs∗ys)(ym+ys) ≤ B+
where Bi is the dry extract of ingredient i
Sweetness In order to obtain a satisfying taste, the
sweetness of the product has to be in a cer-
tain scale of values
S− ≤ (Sm∗ym+Ss∗ys)(ym+ys) ≤ S+
where Si is the sweetening power of ingre-
dient i
Quantity The sum of the proportions of each ingre-
dient must be equal to 100%
ym+ ys+ y f = 100%
Due to other ingredients encountered such
as water or starch, this constraint has been
released for sweet and flavored dairy prod-
uct with skimmed milk, as follows:
ym+ ys+ y f ≤ 100%
Fermentation Sweetening ingredients, in too high pro-
portion, can inhibit the growth of bacteria,
and thus the fermentation process
Bs∗ys
(ym+ys)
≤ F+
where Bs is the dry extract of the sweeten-
ing ingredient
Gelation Sweetening ingredients, in too high pro-
portion, can dilute milk proteins and thus
hinder the gelation process
ym∗Protm
(ym+ys)
≥ G+
where Protm is the protein content of ma-
trix ingredient
Regulatory A dairy product may be supplemented with
flavoring ingredients, provided that this ad-
dition does not exceed 30% of the weight
of the finished product
ys+ y f ≤ 30%
N.B.: fermentation and gelation constraints could have been released in the case of fruit dairy products because part of the sugar can be added after fermentation and gelation, via the fruits mix.
Subscript (s), (m) or (f) stands for the sweetening ingredients (s), the matrix ingredient (m), or the fixed ingredient (f).
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Table 15: Constraints specifications
Recipe Matrix ingredients Fixed
ingredients
B− B+ S− S+ F+ G+
Sweet yogurt with
skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with
skimmed milk
- 18.6% 18.9% 10.6 12 11.7% 3.50%
Sweet yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
- 19.5% 22.4% 9.7 11.9 11.7% 3.85%
Sweet yogurt with whole
milk
Plain yogurt with whole
milk
- 21.1% 22.1% 9.4 14.2 11.7% 3.80%
Flavored yogurt with
skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with
skimmed milk
Aroma
0.5%
18.6% 18.9% 10.7 12 11.8% 3.50%
Flavored yogurt with
semi-skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
Aroma
0.5%
18.0% 21.3% 8.3 11.8 11.8% 3.80%
Flavored yogurt with
whole milk
Plain yogurt with whole
milk
Aroma
0.5%
20.4% 22.6% 9.3 11.2 11.8% 3.63%
Flavored Greek yogurt Plain yogurt with whole
milk and cream
Aroma
0.5%
21.4% 24.8% 9.0 13.3 11.8% 3.38%
Fruit yogurt with
skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with
skimmed milk
Fruits
≤ 13%
18% 19.4% 9.5 10 16.1% 4.10%
Fruit yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
Plain yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
Fruits
≤ 7.4%
19.4% 24.3% 9.2 14.4 16.1% 3.60%
Fruit yogurt with whole
milk
Plain yogurt with whole
milk
Fruits
≤ 19%
20.3% 27.4% 8.7 16.3 16.1% 3.50%
Fruit Greek yogurt Plain yogurt with whole
milk and cream
Fruits≤ 9% 22% 29.3% 8.5 16.9 16.1% 3.30%
Fruit "petit suisses"
semi-skimmed milk
Plain "petit suisses"
semi-skimmed milk
Fruits≤ 7% 25.7% 26% 11.4 16.3 - -
Fruit "petit suisses"
whole milk
Plain "petit suisses"
whole milk
Fruits
≤ 13%
25.58% 30.1% 13 15.7 - -
Flavored fromages
blancs with skimmed
milk
Plain fromages blancs
with skimmed milk
Aroma
0.5%
21.3% 22.8% 10.9 11.8 - -
Fruit fromages blancs
with semi-skimmed milk
Plain fromages blancs
with semi-skimmed milk
Fruits≤ 8% 22.95% 30.4% 8.3 18.1 - -
Fruit fromages blancs
with whole milk
Plain fromages blancs
with whole milk
Fruits
≤ 10%
28.2% 33.4% 11.6 19.3 - -
Compotes Fruit puree Additives
such as
ascorbic
acid 0.1%
19.4% 30.1% 16.5 26.8 - -
Diet compotes Fruit puree Additives
such as
ascorbic
acid 0.1%
17.4% 23.1% 14.5 21.5 - -
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Table 16: Dry extract, sweetening power and protein content of ingredients
Ingredient Type of ingredient Dry extract
Bi
Sweetening
power Si
Protein content
Proti
Plain yogurt with skimmed
milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 11.70% 1.42 4.50%
Plain yogurt with semi-
skimmed milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 12.30% 1.39 4.25%
Plain yogurt with whole
milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 14.30% 1.36 4.20%
Plain yogurt with whole
milk and cream
Matrix ingredient (m) 15.75% 1.21 3.92%
Plain "petit suisses" semi-
skimmed milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 16.3% 0.576 -
Plain "petit suisses" whole
milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 19.5% 0.544 -
Plain fromages blancs with
skimmed milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 13.2% 0.680 -
Plain fromages blancs with
semi-skimmed milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 16.3% 0.576 -
Plain fromages blancs with
whole milk
Matrix ingredient (m) 19.5% 0.544 -
Fruit puree Matrix ingredient (m) 15.3% 12.70 -
Sugar Sweetening ingredient (s) 100% 100 -
Table 17: Optimized minimum amount of added sugar
Recipe Minimum amount of
added sugar Ysmin
Sweet yogurt with skimmed milk 9.5%
Sweet yogurt with semi-skimmed milk 8.4%
Sweet yogurt with whole milk 8.2%
Flavored yogurt with skimmed milk 9.5%
Flavored yogurt with semi-skimmed milk 7.0%
Flavored yogurt with whole milk 8.0%
Flavored Greek yogurt 7.8%
Fruit yogurt with skimmed milk 7.1%
Fruit yogurt with semi-skimmed milk 7.5%
Fruit yogurt with whole milk 6.0%
Fruit Greek yogurt 6.8%
Fruit "petit suisses" with semi-skimmed milk 10.4%
Fruit "petit suisses" with whole milk 10.9%
Flavored fromages blancs with skimmed milk 10.2%
Fruit fromages blancs with semi-skimmed milk 7.3%
Fruit fromages blancs with whole milk 10.0%
Compotes 4.8%
Diet Compotes 2.5%
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Table 18: Content in caloric sweeteners before and after reformulation by brands and product categories
(g/100g of product)
Product categories
Compotes Yaourts Fromages blancs, Desserts
petits suisses frais
Before After Before After Before After
Brand 1 9.55 7.96 9.23 8.11 19.99
Brand 2 6.43 6.43 4.89 4.89 11.20
Brand 3 5.14 5.14
Brand 4 7.45 5.93
Brand 5 9.71 9.24 8.35 7.33
Brand 6 9.05 7.27 9.96 8.11 16.22
Brand 7 11.47 9.79 5.64 5.51 16.90
Brand 8 11.16 8.42
Brand 9 12.20 7.70
Brand 10 14.12 11.32 9.90 8.85 4.72 4.27 14.85
Brand 11 14.48 12.81 13.65
Brand 12 9.77 9.31 4.67 4.43 17.05
Brand 13 7.13 6.44 12.10
PLs 14.58 12.24 9.63 8.19 6.91 6.10 16.63
All 14.51 12.21 9.53 8.11 7.26 6.46 16.85
Table 19: Fat Content before and after reformulation by brands and product categories (g/100g of product)
Product categories
Compotes Yaourts Fromages blancs, Desserts
petits suisses frais
Before After Before After Before After
Brand 1 3.90 3.98 5.58 5.64 5.72
Brand 2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.90
Brand 3 0.69 0.69
Brand 4 0.87 0.89
Brand 5 2.60 2.62 3.16 3.19
Brand 6 2.19 2.24 3.80 4.01 7.05
Brand 7 4.68 4.73 2.42 2.42 2.20
Brand 8 1.89 1.98
Brand 9 1.40 1.46
Brand 10 0.42 0.42 2.62 2.66 3.04 3.05 12.94
Brand 11 0.51 0.51 2.83
Brand 12 1.62 1.63 3.53 3.53 6.86
Brand 13 2.98 2.99 2.10
PLs 0.27 0.27 2.39 2.45 4.06 4.11 4.82
All 0.32 0.32 2.41 2.46 3.90 3.95 5.61
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7.4 Additional tables
Table 20: Average own-price elasticities by brands and product categories.
Compotes Yogurts Fromages blancs, Other dairy
petits suisses desserts
Brand 1 -2.47 -3.09 -3.00
Brand 2 -2.42 -3.03 -3.43
Brand 3 -3.59
Brand 4 -3.28
Brand 5 -2.81 -3.45
Brand 6 -2.57 -3.68 -3.26
Brand 7 -2.40 -2.84 -3.40
Brand 8 -2.52
Brand 9 -2.58
Brand 10 -3.17 -2.25 -3.12 -3.67
Brand 11 -3.20 -3.48
Brand 12 -2.37 -3.42 -3.63
Brand 13 -3.36 -3.40
PLs -2.59 -2.09 -2.64 -2.68
All -2.76 -2.40 -2.89 -2.95
Note: The reported own-price elasticity of a brand and a category is the weighted average (using market shares as weights) of the own-price
elasticity of products of this brand in this category.
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Table 21: Taxation with product reformulation: Average pass-through rates across brands and product
categories.
Compotes Yaourts FBPS ODD
Brand 1 1.22 1.24 1.23
Brand 2 1.26
Brand 3
Brand 4 1.23
Brand 5 1.22 1.26
Brand 6 1.19 1.28 1.25
Brand 7 1.19 1.22 1.24
Brand 8 1.20
Brand 9 1.21
Brand 10 1.23 1.20 1.24 1.30
Brand 11 1.22 1.25
Brand 12 1.18 1.24 1.29
Brand 13 1.26 1.24
PLs 1.18 1.18 1.21 1.19
All 1.19 1.19 1.23 1.22
A proportional tax of e 0.20 per 100g of sugar is implemented when sugar content is above 12g for compote and 8g for other product category.
Table 22: Decrease in the average tax rate by product category and by firm due to product reformulation (in
e cents /kg)
Product ∆ tax Firm ∆ tax
Category
Compotes 4.9 Firm 1 1.3
Yogurts 2.8 Firm 2 2.3
FBPS 1.7 Firm 3 3.7
ODD 0 .0 Firm 4 4.6
Firm 5 2.2
Firm 6 0.6
Firm 7 1.7
A proportional tax of e 0.20 per 100g of sugar is implemented when sugar content is above 12g for compote and 8g for other product
categories.
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